security rule for the prometheus postgresql exporter.

This commit is contained in:
Andrea Dell'Amico 2026-08-13 00:19:36 +02:00
parent 32322be453
commit 035004d263
Signed by: adellam
GPG Key ID: 147ABE6CEB9E20FF
2 changed files with 21 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -43,6 +43,26 @@ resource "openstack_networking_secgroup_rule_v2" "prometheus-node" {
remote_ip_prefix = local.basic_services_ip.prometheus_cidr
}
# postgres_exporter, installed by the postgresql role on the database server
# (see infrastructure-playbooks, postgresql-cloud.yml).
#
# In the DEFAULT security group and not in modules/postgresql on purpose: the
# address Prometheus scrapes is the one on the main private network, and that
# port carries the default security group only - the groups of the module are
# attached to the service port, on the dedicated database network. Same reason,
# and same shape, as the node exporter rule above: the source is a single host,
# and a VM that does not run the exporter has nothing listening on 9187.
resource "openstack_networking_secgroup_rule_v2" "prometheus-postgres-exporter" {
security_group_id = openstack_networking_secgroup_v2.default.id
description = "Prometheus access to the postgres exporter"
direction = "ingress"
ethertype = "IPv4"
protocol = "tcp"
port_range_min = 9187
port_range_max = 9187
remote_ip_prefix = local.basic_services_ip.prometheus_cidr
}
#
# SSH access to the jump proxy. Used by the jump proxy VM only
resource "openstack_networking_secgroup_v2" "access_to_the_jump_proxy" {

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long